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School closures are one of many non-pharmaceutical interven-tions that can be employed during epidemics of dropletinfections, such as influenza, to reduce transmission, and can be
highly effective1–3. However, there are substantial societal and eco-
nomic costs associated with closing large numbers of schools, such as
limiting children’s access to education and requiring caregivers to stay
at home (impacting on household income and on economic
activity)4–8, which can affect more economically deprived households
most9. As with any public health intervention, it is important for
policy makers to balance the public health benefits of school closures
with the associated economic and social impact. To do this effectively,
clear understanding of the relative benefit of closing schools and
therefore the potential impact of reopening is required.
School closures were introduced as a central component of the
response to the COVID-19 outbreak in many countries around
the world10. The UK closed all schools on 23 March 2020 to all
but the children of essential workers and the most vulnerable.
Schools in England remained closed to the majority of students
until the beginning of the academic year (September 2020).
Although reported cases of COVID-19 continue to be low
amongst school-aged children, the role of children in transmitting
COVID-19 remains unclear11–15, and studies in the UK show
comparable prevalence in children and adults16. The contribution
of transmission within schools to transmission within the com-
munity is still uncertain and may have been an important factor
in the resurgence of disease in the population in recent months.
Notwithstanding the poorly quantified risk, over the summer
there was growing concern regarding the potential impact of
prolonged closures on the wellbeing of the population at large17.
A report from the Royal Society voices concerns that maintaining
widespread closures does not just pose a risk to children’s well-
being in the immediate term but may also have long term con-
sequences for the skill level of the future workforce and therefore
economic growth of the UK18. These concerns ultimately led to
the decision to reopen schools to all years in September 2020.
The potential contribution of schools to transmission is twofold:
firstly, the number of potentially infectious contacts increases
through children mixing in schools. Secondly, transmission within
schools can facilitate transmission between households, and
households with multiple school-aged children attending different
schools may act as a route for transmission between schools. This
second impact can be considered as a network of schools and
households linked by pupils. While strict stay-at-home orders (so-
called lockdowns) as implemented in many countries had the aim
of removing the links in the network such that chains of infection
could not progress beyond individual households, reopening
schools has the potential of reconnecting households with each
other such that longer chains of infection can arise.
Here, we investigate the connectivity of the school and household
network and, consequently, on the potential for schools to con-
tribute to transmission by allowing chains of transmission to infect
many households. We quantify this by presenting the potential
reach of an outbreak among families with school-aged children,
under the assumption that children are effective at transmitting the
virus. We do so by using a large data set of household addresses of
school children in England to quantify the probability of trans-
mission via pupils who reside in a common household as the edges
on a network of schools. We use this framework to analyse the
potential for these links between schools to form large networks of
infectious contact and therefore large outbreak clusters within the
school-age population and their household members.
Results
Networks of household-based contact between schools. We
constructed a set of seven networks of schools using individual-level
de-identified data of pupils attending state-funded schools in Eng-
land. Links between schools were defined by the number of unique
contact opportunities (pupil to pupil) formed through shared
households. First, we constructed a network with schools fully open
(all pupils attending school) and included 21,583 schools, attended by
4.6 million primary school children and 3.4 million secondary school
children in attendance, living at 4.9 million unique addresses (Fig. 1).
The remaining six networks each represented a reopening
scenario relevant to policy in England, illustrated in Fig. 2. In each
scenario different combinations of year-groups return to school:
early-years education (Reception and Year 1, i.e. 4–6-year-olds)
and time-sensitive groups in transition, e.g. through exam
certifications or transitional years (Year 6, i.e. 10–11-year-olds,
Year 10, i.e. 14–15-year-olds and Year 12, i.e. 16–17-year-olds)19.
These contained between 21 and 100% of all schools and between
35 and 66% of all households (Table 1).
With schools fully open the mean unweighted degree of the
schools in the network (average number of schools each school is
connected to) was 25 with a maximum of 400. The mean number
of contact pairs to all other schools was 184 with a maximum of
2045 (Fig. 1). Secondary schools were more connected to the
network with higher mean degree, 65 schools, and weighted
degree, 480 contact pairs. Primary schools were less connected
with mean degree and weighted degrees of 16 schools and 113
contact pairs, respectively and a maximum degree of 127 schools
and weighted degree of 806 contact pairs.
With only primary school years open (i.e. secondary years did
not attend school) the mean degree reduced to 6 schools and
mean weighted degree to 22 contact pairs. When only secondary
school years were open, the mean degree and weighted degree
reduced to 22 schools and 103 contact pairs respectively.
Degree distributions of the transmission probability network.
From the contact networks, we estimated the probability of trans-
mission between each pair of schools to assign as edge weights in a
transmission probability network for each reopening scenario. With
all schools fully open, the mean weighted degree of the transmission
probability network (i.e., the mean expected number of schools
infected by any individual school) varied between 0.42 for R of 1.1,
to 3.6 for an R of 1.5. The school with the highest weighted degree
varied between 4.7 to 35.5 for R of 1.1 and 1.5, respectively.
When the network was modified to only include pupils from
certain years the mean degrees decreased (Fig. 3). Scenario 1
(Reception and Years 1 and 6) had the lowest mean weighted
degree (0.01–0.09) for all values of R, suggesting that on average
each school had ~1–10% chance of infecting one other school.
The maximum weighted degree ranged between 0.13 and 1.2, i.e.
if an outbreak occurred in the most connected school, it would be
expected to infect 1.2 other schools with R of 1.5. Scenario 6
(opening secondary schools only) had the highest mean weighted
degree, 0.26–2.6 across values of R 1.1 to 1.5 suggesting that even
at low R (1.1) there would be approximately a 25% chance, on
average, of infecting a second school and at high R (1.5) each
school would on average infect 2 or 3 schools during an outbreak.
After scenario 6, scenario 5 (primary schools only) had the
highest mean degree, between 0.05 and 0.45. Scenarios 2–4, which
all combined some partial opening of primary and secondary
schools, had relatively similar degree distributions to that of fully
opening only, primary schools (Table 2). Of these, scenario 3
(Reception and Years 1, 6 and 12) had the lowest mean degree for
each value of R, between 0.01 and 0.15.
Connected components of binary outbreak networks. Using the
transmission probability networks, we generated 1000 realisations
of binary outbreak networks for each scenario, where the edges
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between schools were weighted either 1, with probability equal to
the transmission network, or 0. If schools were linked by an edge
of weight 1, transmission occurred between the schools in that
realisation, edges of weight 0 indicated no transmission between
the schools they linked. Connected components on these net-
works formed groups of schools that would be infected in an
outbreak initiated in the same group, for that realisation.
The number of schools in the largest connected component,
that is, the number of schools in the largest connected part of the
network, increased with R for each scenario, increasing the
number of households at risk (Fig. 4, Supplementary Fig. 1) For
scenario 1 (Reception, Year 1, Year 6), the median largest
components simulated ranged between 3 and 9 schools or 630
and 16,031 households across R values considered, and there were
very few exceeding 10 schools in each realisation (Fig. 5), these
connected components typically represented fewer than 1000
households in total.
Adding either of secondary school years 10 or 12 to the
network (scenarios 2 and 3) increased the largest connected
component size considerably. The size of the largest component
was comparable to scenario 1 at a low R of 1.1, with a median
largest component size of <6 schools for all 5 scenarios. However,
the largest connected components for realisations at R of 1.5
reached many tens of schools for scenarios 2 and 3 (171 and 36,
respectively, compared to 9 for scenario 1) and thousands more
households (29,517 and 7245, respectively, compared to 1631 for
scenario 1). Adding both Years 10 and 12 had similar largest
component size to scenarios 1–3 at 1.1 (6 schools and 1732
households), however, the largest component at 1.5 was much
larger than the other scenarios affecting 1760 schools and 327,433
households. Opening only primary school years (scenario 5)
resulted in comparable largest component sizes to scenario 4 at
lower values of R but at R of 1.5 resulted in a median largest
component of less than a third of schools (median of 418) and
less than half as many households (median of 126,561). Largest
components were consistently larger when only secondary
schools were included in the network, with a median of 50 schools
and 44,644 households with an R of 1.1 increasing to 3904 schools
and 2,450,215 households at an R of 1.5 which accounts for 85%
of schools and 93% of households.
Despite the increase in largest component size at higher values
of R, for scenarios 1–5, the substantial majority of schools
remained in small components of <5 schools, even with R at 1.5:
17,909 (>99% of schools in the network), 18,024 (84%), 19,442
(97%), 15,716 (73%), 14,130 (79%) for scenarios 1–5, respectively.
Whereas for scenario 6, where all secondary school years return,
Fig. 1 School contact networks. Networks of contact through households between 21,608 state-funded schools in England plotted by location. a Network
with all school years in attendance. b Network with only primary school years in attendance. c Network with only secondary school years in attendance.
Nodes show schools with size determined by the weighted degree of the node (number of unique contact pairs with any other school). Edge widths that
indicate the number of unique contact pairs between the schools the edge connects. Red nodes show secondary schools (mean age ≥11 years), blue nodes
show primary schools (mean age <11 years). Followed by degree distributions of the networks of contact through households. d A histogram of the number
of schools connected by at least one contact pair and e a histogram of the number of unique contact pairs with all other schools in the network including all
school years (i.e. that shown in panel a). for all schools (grey) dots, secondary schools (mean age ≥11 years, red circles), and primary schools (mean age
<11 years, blue, circles). f A histogram of the number of schools connected by at least one contact pair and g a histogram of the number of unique contact
pairs with all other schools in the network including all school years (grey), the network including only secondary school years (blue) and the network
including only primary school years (red).
NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-021-22213-0 ARTICLE
NATURE COMMUNICATIONS |         (2021) 12:1942 | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-021-22213-0 |www.nature.com/naturecommunications 3
only 538 (12% of schools in the network) schools formed
components of <5 schools.
Discussion
Our results suggest that allowing schools to open with a small
selection of school years may only present a small risk of trans-
mission between schools and, consequently, the households of
school children. The analysis also highlights the difference in risk
posed by secondary schools relative to primary schools, where
reopening even a small subset of secondary school years (Years 10
and 12) increases the connectivity between schools considerably,
whereas opening all primary schools resulted in lower con-
nectivity in the network. Furthermore, opening secondary schools
alone resulted in the highest connectivity of all the partial
reopening scenarios evaluated.
Recent studies showed that outbreaks in primary schools were
smaller than in secondary schools in the same area20 and that
older children might pose a greater risk of onwards transmission
in households than younger ones21. In combination, these studies
suggest that primary schools contribute less to community
infections than secondary schools and support the prioritisation
of allowing primary schools to open17, although if children in
secondary schools were better able to practice physical distancing
than primary schools, this could act to counterbalance the addi-
tional risk. Under the assumption that primary school children
transmit the virus less efficiently than older school children15, the
difference between the scenarios of reopening either primary or
secondary schools would be expected to be greater than what we
found. In the extreme case where primary school children were
not able to transmit the virus at all, the scenario of reopening all
years would be the same as reopening only secondary schools.
Our assumption is that transmission between school-aged chil-
dren is sufficient to sustain an outbreak within a school, i.e. R > 1.
Although there is some evidence of transmission within
schools20,22 and that closing schools reduced the growth rate of
the epidemic23, other studies have shown that transmission in
Fig. 2 Breakdown of school years in England and reopening scenarios evaluated. Circles represent school years and each row shows a different
reopening scenario. Circles are coloured green to indicate inclusion in each scenario. Circles outlined in orange represent a transition year, circles outlined
in yellow represent an exam year.
Table 1 The number of schools open and households with children attending school in each school reopening scenario.
Scenario Number of schools % of all schools Number of households % of all households
1| R, Y1, Y6 17,953 83 1,728,173 37
2| R, Y1, Y6, Y10 21,438 99 2,211,384 45
3| R, Y1, Y6, Y12 19,982 93 1,926,090 39
4| R, Y1, Y6, Y10, Y12 21,480 >99 2,381,729 48
5| Primary schools (R–Y6) 17,984 83 3,267,414 66
6| Secondary schools (Y7–Y13) 4555 21 2,627,640 53
All schools 21,583 100 4,927,163 100
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schools did not contribute greatly to the overall epidemic prior to
closure24,25. Since reopening in September there has been mixed
evidence of transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in schools26,27. How-
ever, because evidence of school outbreaks is largely based on
passive case detection, the true risk of school transmission may be
substantially under-reported as children have a lower risk of
developing symptoms after infection. Moreover, UK prevalence
surveys show 11–18-year-olds routinely have the second-highest
prevalence after 18–29-year-olds. Further, school children are
estimated to be several times more likely to introduce infection
into the household than adults—a rate which has increased since
schools reopened in September16, suggesting that transmission in
schools may have been an important factor in driving the out-
break since school reopening. Consensus on this matter remains
elusive28, and our results should therefore be considered in light
of the most recent available evidence to the reader.
Although we found that varying the reproduction number
within the schools, R, had a substantial impact on the number of
households in the largest potential outbreak cluster (indicated by
the largest component), there was little impact on the results for
the vast majority of schools’ component sizes, suggesting that
particular parts of the network were more closely connected than
Fig. 3 The expected number of schools infected by each school. Weighted degree distribution of the transmission probability network for each of the
reopening scenarios considered for R values of 1.1–1.5. Panels a–f show reopening scenarios 1–6, respectively, and panel g shows the network with all school
years in attendance. Vertical lines show the mean degree for each value of R.
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the rest of the network. This could translate to particular geo-
graphical areas being disproportionately affected following the
reopening of schools. Increasing R also had some impact on the
weighted degree distribution of the transmission probability net-
work, suggesting that in that case the virus may spread more
effectively across connected components even if the eventual
outbreak cluster size remained similar. This may impact the
effectiveness of targeted interventions, as identifying a school
outbreak before an outbreak in an adjacent school has been seeded
may become more challenging. This is analogous to challenges in
contact tracing due to pre-symptomatic infection29,30.
Our network focusses on transmission in schools and house-
holds between school-aged children and aims to provide insight
into the capacity for transmission within schools and households
to develop into large outbreak clusters involving multiple schools.
Further, we cannot account for mixing among children from
different schools or households occurring outside of school
contexts12. The data from which the network was constructed,
included only state-funded schools in England with children
coded as school years Reception to Year 13 in official data. The
addition of independent schools would increase the size and
possibly the connectivity of the network, however, only 7% of
children in England attend an independent school so the impact
may be marginal.
Our model presupposes that the expected outbreak risk within
the school network is closely related to the risk within the wider
community. That is, the risk of an infectious pupil seeding a
school outbreak is proportional to the prevalence of infection in
the community. Therefore, the transmission risks associated with
opening schools would be expected to increase as prevalence in
the surrounding community increases.
The way we quantified the probability of transmission between
schools assumed that each school outbreak reached its theoretical
unmitigated final size, this may not occur if interventions, such as
targeted school or class closure are introduced. For example,
closure of schools when a small number of cases are reported
could be an effective means to curb transmission31,32 early on,
however, to the knowledge of the authors, the effectiveness of
such reactive closures is yet to be quantified in the context of
SARS-COV-2. This framework also implies a well-mixed contact
network within each school, final sizes are likely to be smaller due
to preferential mixing within school years, classes and by
gender33–35. In addition, if schools implement social bubbles to
introduce community structure in the contact network and
therefore reduce the probability of a school-wide outbreak36. This
is partly reflected in the low values of R that have been chosen
relative to those estimated early in the outbreak of 2.0–3.1)37 but
our estimates of the number of households impacted may still be
an overestimate compared to any real situation which would
include mitigation measures (e.g., improved hand hygiene and
use of face masks) and reactive interventions in response to cases
detected in schools.
Table 2 Weighted degree of the transmission network and largest components of the binary outbreak networks.
Scenario R Weighted degree of
transmission probability
network
Households in largest component of binary
outbreak networks
Schools in largest component
binary outbreak networks
Median Mean Max Median Low High Median Low High
1: R, Y1, Y6 1.1 0.00 0.01 0.13 630 596 889 3 2 4
1.2 0.02 0.02 0.39 843 672 1154 4 3 5
1.3 0.03 0.05 0.67 1023 800 1350 5 4 7
1.4 0.04 0.07 0.95 1313 1000 1893 7 5 9
1.5 0.06 0.09 1.20 1631 1214 2390 9 7 12
2: R, Y1, Y6, Y10 1.1 0.02 0.03 0.27 1009 828 1389 5 4 6
1.2 0.06 0.10 0.87 2154 1569 3778 10 8 17
1.3 0.12 0.18 1.60 4790 3262 8693 23 17 40
1.4 0.17 0.26 2.37 12,529 7940 21,818 66 41 114
1.5 0.23 0.34 3.11 29,517 21,151 52,983 171 112 272
3: R, Y1, Y6, Y12 1.1 0.01 0.01 0.30 1166 1166 1408 3 3 5
1.2 0.02 0.04 0.98 1491 1166 2078 6 5 9
1.3 0.04 0.08 1.82 2173 1651 3685 10 8 16
1.4 0.07 0.11 2.71 4047 2686 6355 19 13 32
1.5 0.09 0.15 3.58 7245 4402 13,766 36 22 71
4: R, Y1, Y6, Y10, Y12 1.1 0.02 0.04 0.66 1732 1366 2396 6 5 8
1.2 0.08 0.12 2.13 4853 3301 7513 18 14 32
1.3 0.14 0.22 3.91 25,024 14,540 42,580 114 70 186
1.4 0.21 0.33 5.74 174,846 87,381 226,272 852 427 1139
1.5 0.27 0.44 7.50 327,433 291,536 403,243 1760 1544 2228
5: Primary years 1.1 0.02 0.05 0.60 1956 1540 2853 6 4 8
1.2 0.08 0.15 1.46 5366 3947 9253 16 12 26
1.3 0.14 0.26 2.61 19,639 13,524 32,166 59 38 90
1.4 0.22 0.36 3.87 55,770 36,732 106,602 167 105 337
1.5 0.29 0.45 5.10 126,561 76,626 229,320 418 257 768
6: Secondary years 1.1 0.19 0.26 2.21 44,644 26,654 96,454 50 30 106
1.2 0.60 0.81 6.46 718,224 639,961 887,222 960 842 1212
1.3 1.08 1.43 10.60 1,588,903 1,299,424 1,859,976 2341 1916 2758
1.4 1.57 2.04 13.98 2,221,866 2,098,546 2,345,972 3449 3225 3635
1.5 2.02 2.60 16.91 2,450,215 2,314,264 2,502,364 3904 3658 3998
Median, mean and maximum weighted degree on the transmission probability network (expected number of schools infected by each school) and median range (low and high) of the 90% Credible
Interval over 1000 realisations of the binary outbreak network.
ARTICLE NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-021-22213-0
6 NATURE COMMUNICATIONS |         (2021) 12:1942 | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-021-22213-0 | www.nature.com/naturecommunications
Our framework assumes no presence of immunity, however,
there is evidence of immunity to SARS-COV-2 in children16. The
true immunity in schools is likely to vary both by region and
between schools, however, the resolution of data on immunity in
England is poor and certainly cannot be resolved at a school level.
Similarly, the reproduction number was assumed to be invariant
between schools, this approach was chosen to maintain the parsi-
mony of the approach, as modelling internal transmission dynamics
of individual schools would considerably increase the complexity. In
light of these simplifications, our results should be interpreted as the
maximal risk posed by transmission within and between schools.
We assumed child-to-child transmission within households
occurs with probability q= 0.15, which is consistent with
estimates of the household secondary attack rate38,39. To assess
the robustness of the results to this assumption, we re-ran the
analysis with q= 0.3 and q= 0.08 (Supplementary Figs. 2–5), and
although the sizes of the connected components changed, the
relative impact of scenarios remained comparable to the main
analysis. In the absence of more robust evidence, however, we
cannot rule out that transmission between children might be
different from general transmission patterns to a degree that
would fundamentally affect our results.
Our analysis provides insight into the potential for school-
based and household-based contacts between children to combine
to create long chains of transmission which could result in
infections within many thousands of households. We highlight
Fig. 5 Connected component distributions. The distribution of component sizes of the binary outbreak networks generated for school reopening scenarios
and R values of 1.1–1.5 (indicated by colour). By households, i.e. the number of households in a component size in each bin, panels a–f show reopening
scenarios 1–6, respectively, and panel g shows the network with all school years in attendance. By school, i.e. the number of schools in a component size in
each bin, panels h–m show reopening scenarios 1–6, respectively, and panel n shows the network with all school years in attendance. The bars show the
median and error bars show 90% credible intervals for 1000 realisations of binary outbreak networks.
Fig. 4 Largest components of the binary outbreak networks. The number of households with children attending a school in each largest connected
component of the binary transmission networks (estimated potential outbreak cluster size) generated from transmission probability networks for school
reopening scenarios. The points show the median and error bars show the 90% credible intervals for 1000 realisations of binary outbreak networks. The
green dashed line shows the total number of households in the school system (4,927,163 households).
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that the potential contribution of schools to transmission varies
substantially between the tested scenarios. Reintroducing primary
school years had much lower risk of transmission between
schools than secondary school years. We also highlight that
maintaining restrictions on contact between children within
schools to ensure a low within-school reproduction number may
be highly influential, as the rate of transmission between schools
increases rapidly with R on some parts of the network. Further-
more, such restrictions may be essential for suppressing trans-
mission. While our results should not be considered as realistic
epidemiological projections, our simulations provide an indica-
tion of the relative impact of each scenario, using highly resolved
schools data. Further analysis using this network may provide
more precise guidance, particularly on reactive school closure
strategies in the event of detecting a school outbreak, where the
network itself may serve as a tool to aid targeted interventions. If
detailed projections were desired, the framework could be
extended to include within-school contact structure, however, this
would greatly increase the network size and therefore computa-
tional effort required. The principles highlighted in our analyses
are not constrained to SARS-CoV-2 and may be considered when
evaluating interventions for any epidemic in which children are
known to transmit infection.
Our results are directly applicable to the school system in
England. Although the network properties of school systems
around the world may vary, we anticipate these results would be
qualitatively similar in other settings with broadly comparable
education frameworks.
Methods
Data. Individual-level de-identified data of pupils attending state-funded schools in
England was provided by the UK Department for Education (DfE) under a formal
data-sharing agreement. The use of this data was also reviewed and approved (Ref:
22476) by the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine Research Ethics
Committee. The data includes an entry for each pupil for each institution they
attend, Unique Reference Number (URN) for the school, school postcode, pupil’s
postcode and pupil’s address, collected between September and December 2019.
We combined the student’s postcode and address to assign a household code for
each group of pupils that were found to live at the same address, where we assume
each individual address operates as a single household for social distancing pur-
poses. We tested this method by comparing the assigned codes to official unique
address codes provided in the data for 53% of the pupils. We found that of these,
99.8% of households with more than one pupil were correctly identified as a single
household and 0.2% of households were mistakenly merged with another house-
hold (Supplementary Table 1). Using our assigned household code, we were able to
estimate the number of unique contacts between each pair of schools. For each
pupil, we have included only institutions coded as the pupil’s current main school
and have excluded pupils listed as boarders (those who are resident at their school
during term time). More details of data cleaning are included in Supplementary
Note 1.
Reopening scenarios. Typically, there are 14 school years in the English school
system (Fig. 2), which each run from September to September. Children enter
Reception aged 4 and complete 7 years of primary school leaving Year 6 aged 11.
They transition to secondary school into Year 7 where all pupils are expected to
complete 5 years of secondary education (until the age of 16). At this point,
children are able to leave school or progress to further education (FE), which may
be in the same institution as other secondary school years or a separate institution
offering only FE courses.
There are exceptions to this two/three institution framework, where some
schools offer a different subset of school years (for example the first 3 years of
primary education). For this analysis all reopening scenarios are assumed to
operate on a school year basis, hence assuming that all children from the
appropriate years return regardless of the nature of their institution.
We considered six reopening scenarios relevant to policy in England, illustrated
in Fig. 2. In each scenario different combinations of year-groups return to school:
early-years education (Reception and Year 1, i.e. 4–6-year-olds) and time-sensitive
groups in transition, e.g. through exam certifications or transitional years (Year 6,
i.e. 10–11-year-olds, Year 10, i.e. 14–15-year-olds and Year 12, i.e. 16–17-year-
olds)19.
A network of transmission between schools. We used the data to construct a
network of schools linked through households. Each edge on the network of
schools is weighted by the number of unique contacts between schools that occur
through shared households. For example, if in a given household, 2 children attend
school i and 2 children attend school j, this corresponds to 4 unique contacts
between school i and school j. The total number of unique contacts between





Where nk,i is the number of children in household k who attend school i.
From this network, we created a transmission probability network (Fig. 7) where
we estimated the probability of transmission between schools i and j (Ptrans,ij).
Fig. 6 Schematic to demonstrate the principle of a network of schools
linked by households. a A network of schools constructed such that
schools are connected when contact is made between pupils of different
schools within a household. b The strength of contact between schools is
quantified by calculating the number of unique contact pairs (one child in
each school). The number of pairs per household is the product of the
number of children who attend school i and the number of children who
attend school j. The total number of unique pairs is the sum of unique pairs
over all, N, households, k, with children attending both school i and j.
Fig. 7 How contact, transmission and binary outbreak networks relate to each other. a A schematic of a contact network, the width of the edges shows
the number of unique contact pairs between schools. b A schematic of a transmission probability network calculated from the contact network; the shading
of the edges shows the relative probability of transmission between schools. c A schematic of a realisation of a binary outbreak network, where edges are
weighted 1 with probability given by the equivalent edge in the transmission network—indicating transmission between schools, or 0 otherwise. Blue
highlighted nodes show those in the largest connected component.
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We defined transmission between schools as an outbreak in one school leading
to an outbreak in an adjacent school on the network. We simplify within-
household transmission such that only direct transmission between contact pairs
occurs (neglecting the potential for transmission through other members of a
household) and hence approximate the transmission probability between schools
through a single contact pair as.
PobPinf ;jq ð2Þ
where Pob is the probability of an outbreak in school i given one infection, Pinf,j is
the probability of a child in school j being infected and q is the probability of
transmission between children in the same household.
The probability of transmission between schools j and i through all contact
pairs can be approximated as
Ptrans;ij ¼ 1 1 PobPinf ;jq
 Cij ð3Þ
We estimated the probability of an outbreak Pob to be:
Pob ¼ 1 1=R ð4Þ
which reflects a geometric distributed contact rate within the school40. Here, R is
the within-school reproduction number, the average number of secondary
infections in a single school from an index case where all others are susceptible.
This statistic differs from the reproduction number in the general population as it
only includes secondary cases infected within school, which are the result of
transmission from only school-aged children.
We assumed homogeneous mixing within the school population. We then
approximated the probability of a student in school j being infected PIj based on the
expected final size40 of an outbreak with within-school reproduction number R,
Pinf ;j ¼ Z1 ¼ 1 eRZ1 ð5Þ
where Z∞ is the final outbreak size as a proportion of the school population.
We set q, the per-contact probability of transmission between children in the
same household, to 0.15 (consistent with estimates of household secondary attack
rate of SARS-CoV-238).
We repeated the analysis for a range of within-schoolR values between 1.1 and
1.5, leading to outbreak size between 18 and 58% of school children, broadly
spanning the range of reported outbreak sizes of COVID-19 in schools20,22.
For each scenario, we assumed all pupils within the years specified attended
school and contributed to transmission. We assumed that pupils outside of the
specified years did not attend school and therefore did not contribute to
transmission. To simulate this condition, we constructed a network using only data
of pupils in the specified years.
Evaluating the network. To summarise how the potential of transmitting to
adjacent schools in the network varies with R (within school) and the reopening
scenario we calculated the distribution of the weighted degree D of the transmis-
sion network (the distribution of the expected number of schools infected through
households by each school) for each scenario, where the weighted degree of school




To summarise the potential spread of the virus across the network of schools,
we sampled instances of binary outbreak networks, where transmission between
each pair of schools either occurs (edge weight of 1) or does not occur (edge weight
0) (Fig. 7).
Since transmission probabilities are reciprocal, the eventual number of schools
in any outbreak cluster can be defined as a connected component of the outbreak
network (i.e. all schools are connected by edges equal to 1). For a particular school
i, the schools in the same connected component are those that would be infected in
an outbreak seeded at that school (i). The same schools are those in which a seeded
outbreak would eventually infect this school (i). Hence the distribution of the
connected components gives an indication of expected outbreak size and therefore
risk posed to and by individual schools in the network.
Schools vary in size considerably, with large differences between secondary and
primary schools. To reflect the size of outbreaks in terms of the number of
households at risk, we calculated the number of households with children attending
schools within each connected component in the network. Specifically, we
calculated the number of unique households with children attending the schools in
each component (in the appropriate years for each scenario). To summarise the
risk of larger outbreak clusters, we present the distribution of the number of
households associated with each connected component.
All analysis in this study was performed using python 3.7.341. Network analysis
was performed using NetworkX 2.442.
Reporting summary. Further information on experimental design is available in
the Nature Research Reporting Summary linked to this paper.
Data availability
The data that support the findings of this study were made available from UK
Department for Education (DfE) but restrictions apply to the availability of these data,
which were used under license for the current study, and so are not publicly available.
Due to the sensitive nature of the data, they can only be made available by DfE through a
data-sharing agreement directly with the user.
Code availability
The code used for this analysis is available from https://github.com/jdmunday/
SchoolHouseholdNetworksCOVID and archived in a permanent respository43.
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